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Abstract. The Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality test is widely used as a mean
of invalidating the local deterministic theories and a tool of device independent
quantum cryptographic tasks. There exists a randomness (freewill) loophole in the
test, which is widely believed impossible to be closed perfectly. That is, certain
random inputs are required for the test. Following a randomness quantification method
used in literature, we investigate the randomness required in the test under various
assumptions. By comparing the results, one can conclude that the key to make the
test result reliable is to rule out correlations between multiple runs.
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1. Introduction
Historically, Bell tests [1] are proposed for distinguishing quantum theory from local
hidden variable models (LHVMs) [2]. In a general picture, a Bell test involves multiple
parties who randomly choose inputs and generate outputs with pre-shared physical
resources. Based on the probability distributions of inputs and outputs, an inequality,
called Bell’s inequality, is defined. Any Bell test is meaningful only if all LHVMs satisfy
the Bell’s inequality; while in quantum mechanics, such inequality can be violated via
certain quantum settings. Experimental observation of the violation of Bell’s inequality
would show that LHVMs are not sufficient to describe the world, and other theories,
such as the quantum mechanics, are demanded.
In this work, we focus on the bipartite scenario and investigate one of the most well-
known Bell tests, the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [3]. As shown
in Fig. 1(a), two space-like separated parties, Alice and Bob, randomly choose input
settings x and y from an input set I = {0, 1} and generate outputs bits a and b based
on their inputs and pre-shared quantum (ρ) and classical (λ) resources, respectively. The
probability distribution p(a, b|x, y), obtaining outputs a and b conditioned on inputs x
and y, are determined by specific strategies of Alice and Bob. By assuming that the
input settings x and y are chosen fully randomly and equally likely, we define the CHSH
inequalities by convex combining the probability distribution p(a, b|x, y) according to
S =
∑
a,b,x,y
(−1)a⊕b+x·yp(a, b|x, y) ≤ SC = 2, (1.1)
where the plus operation ⊕ is modulo 2, · is numerical multiplication, and SC is the
(classical) bound of Bell value S for all LHVMs. Similarly, there is an achievable bound
SQ = 2
√
2 for the quantum theory [4]. In this case, a violation of the classical bound SC
indicates the need for alternative theories other than LHVMs, such as quantum theory.
For general no signalling (NS) theories [5], we denote the corresponded upper bound as
SNS = 4. It is straightforward to see that SNS ≥ SQ ≥ SC .
In practice, the technique of violating a Bell’s inequality can be applied to other
quantum information tasks, such as, device independent quantum key distribution
[6, 7] and randomness expansion [8, 9]. Security proofs of these tasks are generally
independent of the realization devices or correctness of quantum theory, but relies on
violating a Bell’s inequality. For instance, we can consider the devices of Alice and Bob
as black boxes. In this case, we can assume, in the worse scenario, that an adversary
Eve, instead of Alice and Bob, performs measurements as shown in Fig. 1(b). Because
the two parties are space-like separated, the probability distribution generated in this
way is always within the scope of LHVMs, that is, p(a, b|x, y) = p(a|x, λ1)p(b|y, λ1).
Therefore, Eve cannot fake a violation of any Bell tests, which intuitively explains the
security of the device independent tasks.
Since the first experiment in the early 1980s [10], lots of lab demonstrations of the
CHSH inequality has been presented. These experiment results show explicit violations
of the LHVMs bound SC , and meanwhile, suffer from a few technical and inherent
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Figure 1: Bell tests in the bipartite scenario. (a) The inputs of Alice and
Bob, x and y, are decided by perfect random number generators (RNGs),
which produce uniformly distributed random numbers; (b) The measurement
devices are controlled by an adversary Eve through local hidden variables
λ1; (c) The input random numbers are additionally controlled by some local
hidden variable λ2, which is accessible to Eve.
loopholes, which might invalidate the conclusions. Two well-known technical obstacles
are due to the locality loophole and the detection efficiency loophole, which can be closed
with more delicately designed experiments and developed instruments [11, 12, 13]. In
contrast to the technical loopholes, there also exists an inherent loophole that cannot
be closed perfectly in Bell tests — the input settings may not be chosen randomly.
In the worst case, the inputs can be all predetermined, which makes it possible to
violate the Bell inequalities even with LHVMs. In this case, a witness of violating a
Bell’s inequality does not imply the demands for non-LHVM theories and the Bell test
becomes meaningless. On the other hand, without the quantum theory or violation
of Bell’s inequalities, one cannot get provable randomness. Therefore, the assumption
of true input randomness are indispensable in Bell tests because we cannot prove or
disprove its existence.
Practically, suppose the input settings are partially controlled by an adversary
Eve, who wants to convince Alice and Bob a violation of Bell’s inequality with classical
settings, as shown in Fig. 1(c). In this case, we model the imperfect randomness by
assuming that the input settings x and y are chosen according to some probability
distribution q(x, y|λ2), where λ2 are local variables available to Eve. Now, the
probability distribution p(a, b|x, y) are defined by
p(a, b|x, y) = pA(a|x, λ1)pB(b|y, λ1)q(x, y|λ2). (1.2)
We can therefore rewrite the CHSH inequality, given in Eq. (1.1), as
S = 4
∑
λ
∑
a,b,x,y
(−1)a⊕b+x·ypA(a|x, λ)pB(b|y, λ)q(x, y|λ)q(λ), (1.3)
where the factor 4 is because of the average probability of choosing the input settings
x and y, q(x, y) =
∑
λ q(x, y|λ)q(λ), is required to be 1/4, and the hidden variables
λ1 and λ2 are combined as λ. Notice that, in the extreme (deterministic) case where
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q(x, y|λ) = 0 or 1 for all x, y, the local hidden variables λ deterministically control the
input settings. Then Eve is able to violate Bell tests to an arbitrary value with LHVMs.
On the other hand, if Eve has no control of the input settings where q(x, y|λ) = 1/4 for
all x, y, she cannot fake a violation at all.
Therefore, a meaningful question to ask is how one can assure that a violation of the
CHSH inequality is not caused by Eve’s attack on imperfect input randomness. That is,
we want to know what the requirement of the input randomness is to guarantee that an
observed violation truly stems from quantum effects. In the following, we first introduce
the quantification of input randomness and review previous works on this question in
Section 2. Then we study a simplified case to gain the intuition behind Eve’s optimal
strategy in Section 3. Finally, we investigate the randomness requirement of the CHSH
test and conclude our result in Section 4.
2. Randomness Requirement
Let us start with quantifying the input randomness. Here, we make use of the
randomness parameter P adopted in Ref. [14] to fulfill such an attempt, other tools
such as the Santha-Vazirani source [15] may work similarly. The parameter P is defined
to be the maximum probability of choosing the inputs conditioned on the hidden variable
λ,
P = max
x,y,λ
q(x, y|λ). (2.1)
With this definition, the larger P is, the less input randomness, the more control Eve
has, and the easier for her to fake a quantum violation with LHVMs. In the CHSH
test, P takes values in the regime of [1/4, 1]. When P = 1, it represents the case that
Eve has the most control of Alice and Bob’s inputs, that is, the local hidden variable
λ can determine at least one set of values of x and y. When P = 1/4, it corresponds
to the case of complete randomness, where the adversary have no prior information on
the inputs. Note that the definition of P essentially follows the min-entropy, which
is widely used to quantify randomness of a random variable X in information theory,
Hmin = − log [maxx prob(X = x)].
Intuitively, given complete randomness where P = 1/4, the value S with LHVMs
are bounded by SC as shown in Eq. (1.1); while given the most dependent (on λ)
randomness where P = 1, the value S with LHVMs could reach the mathematical
maximum, SNS in the CHSH test. Then it is interesting to check the maximal S value
for P ∈ (1/4, 1) with LHVMs. In this work, we are interested in when the adversary
can fake a quantum violation given certain randomness P . We thus exam the lower
bound PQ of P such that the Bell test result can reach the quantum bound SQ with
an optimal LHVM. This lower bound PQ puts a minimal randomness requirement in a
Bell test experiment. Only if the freedom of choosing inputs satisfies P < PQ, can one
claim that the Bell test is free of the randomness loophole.
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Recently, lots of efforts have been spent to investigate such requirement of
randomness needed to guarantee the correctness of Bell tests [16, 17, 18, 14, 19, 20].
These works analyze under different conditions. One condition is about whether the
input settings are correlated or not in different runs. We call it single run, referring
to the case that the input settings are independent for different runs, and multiple run
referring to otherwise. The other condition is about whether the random inputs of
Alice and Bob are correlated. Conditioned on these different assumptions of the input
randomness, the lower bound PQ that allows LHVMs to saturate the quantum bound
SQ in the CHSH Bell test is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: The lower bound for randomness parameter P defined in Eq (2.1)
allowing the CHSH value S, defined in Eq. (1.3), to reach the quantum bound
SQ by LHVMs in the CHSH test under different conditions.
Alice Bob correlated Alice Bob uncorrelated
Single Run 0.285 [16, 14] 0.354 [14]
Multiple Run 0.258 [19] ≤ 0.264 (Our Work)
In the single run scenario, the optimal strategy for Eve reaches S = 24P − 4 and
S = 8P in the case that Alice’s and Bob’s input settings are correlated and uncorrelated,
respectively [16, 14]. To achieve the maximum quantum violation SQ = 2
√
2, the critical
randomness requirement is shown in Table 1. It is worth mentioning that if one has
randomness P ≥ PNS = 1/3 and P ≥ PNS = 1/2 for the case of correlated and
uncorrelated, respectively, Eve is able to recover arbitrary NS correlations.
In a more realistic scenario, the multiple run case, the input settings in different
runs are generally correlated. Denote N to be the number of test runs, xi (yi) and ai
(bi) to be the input and output of Alice (Bob) for the ith run, where i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
respectively. In the multiple run scenario, the input settings of Alice and Bob can be
further correlated by
q(x1, x2, . . . , xN , y1, y2, . . . , yN |λ), (2.2)
Therefore, similar to the definition of Eq. (1.3), we define the CHSH test in the multiple
run case,
S =
4
N
∑
λ
∑
a,b,x,y
(−1)a⊕b+x·ypA(a|x, λ)pB(b|y, λ)q(x,y|λ)q(λ), (2.3)
where a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN), b = (b1, b2, . . . , bN), x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN), y =
(y1, y2, . . . , yN), and · is inner product of two vectors, x and y. Now, we can define
the input randomness parameter, as an extension of Eq. (2.1),
P =
(
max
x,y,λ
q(x,y|λ)
)1/N
. (2.4)
It is obvious that the adversary is easier to fake a violation of a Bell test with LHVMs
with increasing number of runs N . This is because the adversary can take advantage
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of additional dependence of the inputs in different runs. It has been shown that with
randomness P ≥ PQ = 0.258, Eve is able to fake the maximum quantum violation SQ
[19]. This result [19] puts a very strict requirement on the RNGs to guarantee a faithful
CHSH test.
A meaningful remaining question is thus to consider the case of multiple run but
uncorrelated scenario. As all Bell experiments must run many times to sample the
probability distribution, it is reasonable and also practical to consider a joint attack
by Eve. On the other hand, the uncorrelated assumption is also reasonable in many
realistic cases, where the experiment instruments of Alice and Bob are manufactured
independently. In fact, if the inputs are determined by cosmic photons that are
causally disconnected from each other, there should be no correlations between the
input randomness of Alice and Bob [21].
Considering uncorrelated inputs of Alice and Bob,
q(x, y|λ) = qA(x|λ)qB(y|λ), (2.5)
we want to investigate the optimal attack with restricted randomness input P in the
following CHSH inequality,
S =
4
N
∑
λ
∑
a,b,x,y
(−1)a⊕b+x·ypA(a|x, λ)pB(b|y, λ)qA(x|λ)qB(y|λ)q(λ).(2.6)
That is, we want to maximize Eq. (2.6) with the constraint of Eq. (2.4). In particular,
we are interested to see when this maximal value can reach SQ = 2
√
2.
3. Single run case
We first review the optimal strategy in the single run scenario [14] to get an intuition
behind the optimal attack of the adversary. Hereafter, we mainly focus on the scenario
that Alice and Bob’s inputs are uncorrelated as defined in Eq. (2.5). Thus, what we
want is to maximize the CHSH value S,
S =
∑
λ
q(λ)Sλ, (3.1)
where
Sλ = 4
∑
a,b,x,y
(−1)a⊕b+x·ypA(a|x, λ)pB(b|y, λ)qA(x|λ)qB(y|λ), (3.2)
with restricted randomness P , given in Eq. (2.1).
Since any probabilistic LHVM, that is, pA(a|x, λ)pB(b|y, λ), could be realized
by a convex combination of deterministic ones [22], it is therefore sufficient to only
consider deterministic LHVMs. Due to the symmetric definition of the CHSH inequality,
we only need to consider a specific strategy of pA(0|x, λ) = pB(0|y, λ) = 1, and
pA(1|x, λ) = pB(1|y, λ) = 0 for some given λ, and all the other ones works similarly. By
substituting the special strategy into Eq. (3.2), we get
Sλ = 4 [qA(0)qB(0) + qA(0)qB(1) + qA(1)qB(0)− qA(1)qB(1)] . (3.3)
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Suppose PA = maxx,λ{qA(x|λ)}, PB = maxy,λ{qB(x|λ)}, and hence P = PAPB, Sλ can
be maximized to
Sλ ≤ 4 [1− 2(1− PA)(1− PB)] = 8(PA + PB − P )− 4. (3.4)
Given P , Sλ is supper bounded by
Sλ ≤ 8P, (3.5)
where the equality holds when PB = 1/2 and PA = 2P . Thus, the optimal strategy with
LHVMs is S = 8P . Note that, when the input settings are fully random, P = 1/4, the
optimal strategy of LHVMs is S = 2, which recovers the original LHVMs bound SC . It
is easy to see that, to saturate the quantum bound SQ = 2
√
2, the randomness should
be at least PQ = SQ/8 =
√
2/4 ≈ 0.354, as shown in Table 1.
In the single run case, we only need to consider deterministic strategies of p(a, b|x, y)
due to the symmetric definition of the CHSH inequality. We also take advantage of this
property in the derivation of the multiple run case. In addition, we can see that the
optimal strategy of LHVMs is to choose x or y fully randomly and the other one as
biased as possible. This biased optimal strategy is counter-intuitive since the adversary
do not need to control the inputs of both parties, but only those of one party. We show
that this counter-intuitive feature does not hold in the optimal strategy in the multiple
run case.
4. Multiple run case
Now we consider the multiple run scenario with uncorrelated input randomness. That
is, optimizing Eve’s LHVM strategy Eq. (2.6) with constraints defined in Eq. (2.4).
Similar to the single run case, from the symmetric argument, we also only need to
consider one specific value of λ in the strategy: pA(0|x, λ) = pB(0|y, λ) = 1, and
pA(1|x, λ) = pB(1|y, λ) = 0. Given the probabilities of Alice’s and Bob’s inputs, qA(x|λ),
qB(y|λ), the CHSH value for this specific λ is given by Eq. (2.6),
Sλ = 4
1− 2
N
∑
x,y∈{0,1}N
x · yqA(x|λ)qB(y|λ)
 . (4.1)
Our attempt is therefore to maximize Eq. (4.1) with constraints
qA(x|λ)qB(y|λ) ≤ PN , (4.2)
for all qA(x|λ) and qB(y|λ).
Since in the single run scenario, the optimal strategy requires only one party with
biased conditional probability, we first analyze the case with only Alice’s inputs biased
and Bob’s inputs uniformly distributed. Then we investigate the case where the inputs
of both parties are biased. We can see that the one party biased strategy is not optimal
in the multiple run case, even when N = 2.
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4.1. One party Biased
In the case when Eve only (partially) controls one of the inputs, say Alice’s, the
probability of Alice’s input string qA(x|λ) is biased and Bob’s input string is uniformly
distributed, that is,
qB(y|λ) = 1
2N
. (4.3)
The randomness is characterized by Eq. (2.4), after substituting Eq. (4.3),
P =
PA
2
, (4.4)
where PA is defined by PA = maxλ,x qA(x|λ)1/N . Then, the CHSH value, Eq. (4.1),
becomes
Sλ = 4
1− 1
N2N−1
∑
x,y∈{0,1}N
x · yqA(x|λ)
 . (4.5)
Denote the number of bit 1 in an N string a as L1(a). Given the number of bit 1
in x, kA = L1(x), we can sum over y,∑
y∈{0,1}N
x · y =
kA∑
j=1
2N−kAj
(
kA
j
)
= 2N−1kA, (4.6)
and group the summation of x according to kA,
Sλ = 4
1− 1
N
N∑
kA=0
∑
L1(x)=kA
qA(x|λ)kA
 , (4.7)
One only need to consider the LHVMs whose probabilities of qA(x|λ) with the same kA
are the same. Otherwise, we can always take an average of qA(x|λ) with the same kA
without increasing the randomness parameter P . Thus we can rewrite Sλ as
Sλ = 4
(
1− 1
N
N∑
kA=0
qkA(x|λ)
(
N
kA
)
kA
)
, (4.8)
with normalization requirement
N∑
kA=0
qkA(x|λ)
(
N
kA
)
= 1, (4.9)
and constraints defined in Eq. (4.2).
The optimization of Eq. (4.8) can be solved sufficiently via linear programming.
Intuitively, to maximize Sλ with given P defined in Eq. (4.4), we can simply assign
qkA(x|λ) that has large kA be 0 and that has smaBll kA be (2P )N . Suppose there exists
an integer l such that P can be written as
P =
1
2
[
l∑
kA=0
(
N
kA
)]−1/N
, (4.10)
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then, Eq. (4.8) can be rewritten as
S = 4
1− 1
N
N∑
kA=0
1
2
(
l∑
kA=0
(
N
kA
))−1/N (
N
kA
)
kA
 . (4.11)
For a general case where an integer l cannot be found satisfying Eq. (4.10), we can first
find an integer l such that,
1
2
[
l+1∑
kA=0
(
N
kA
)]−1/N
< P ≤ 1
2
[
l∑
kA=0
(
N
kA
)]−1/N
. (4.12)
Then we can assign qkA(x|λ) to be
qkA(x|λ) =

(2P )N kA ≤ l[
1−∑lkA=0(2P )N( NkA)]−1/N
( Nl+1)
kA = l + 1
0 kA > l + 1
(4.13)
For finite N , one can numerically solve the problem according to Eq. (4.13). As
shown in Fig. 2, the optimal strategy for N = 1, 10, 100 are calculated. With increasing
N , the optimal value S increases and hence a valid Bell test requires a smaller P (more
randomness).
0.25 0.273 0.354 0.52
2.8284
4
P (Restriction of Freewill)
S 
(O
pti
ma
l C
HS
H 
Va
lue
)
 
 
N = 1
N = 10
N = 100
N = ∞
Figure 2: Optimal value of the CHSH test for given randomness P with
various rounds N based on only one party biased randomness. The solid
line is the optimal strategy for N → ∞, which upper bounds all finite N
rounds. Note that the curve is not smooth for finite runs N because the
optimal strategy qkA defined in Eq. (4.13) jumps in l. With N grows larger,
the curve tends to be smoother.
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In the case of N →∞, we can derive an analytic bound for all finite N strategies.
By following the technique used in Ref. [19], we first can estimate P defined in Eq. (4.12)
with the limit of N →∞ by,
lim
N→∞
P =
1
2
l¯l¯(1− l¯)1−l¯, (4.14)
where l¯ = l/N , and similarly S by,
lim
N→∞
S = 4− 4l¯, (4.15)
where  is an arbitrary positive number. Then we can substitute Eq. (4.15) into
Eq. (4.14), and get a relation between optimized CHSH value S and the corresponding
randomness parameter P ,
P =
1
2
(
4− S
4
)(4−S)/4(
S
4
)(S/4)
. (4.16)
By substituting the quantum bound SQ = 2
√
2 into Eq. (4.16), we can get the
critical randomness requirement to be PQ = 0.273. Note that, although Eve only
control Alice’s input settings, she can still fake a quantum violation with sufficiently
low randomness, which is lower than the single run case even when Alice’s and Bob’s
inputs are correlated. Thus we show that the randomness is more demanded for the
conditions of multiple/single run compared to the correlation between Alice and Bob.
4.2. Both parties biased
Now we consider a general attack, where Eve controls both inputs of Alice and Bob. In
this case, we need to optimize Eq. (4.1) with constraints defined in Eq. (4.2).
Similarly, we also group the summation of x and y according to the corresponded
number of bit 1, kA = L1(x) and kB = L1(y),
Sλ = 4
1− 2
N
N∑
kA,kB=0
∑
L1(x)=kA
∑
L1(y)=kB
qA(x|λ)qB(y|λ)x · y
 . (4.17)
Now, if we assume that qA(x|λ) (qB(y|λ)) has the same value for equal kA (kB), we can
sum over x and y for given kA and kB,∑
kA,kB
x · y =
(
N
kA
) min{kA,kB}∑
j=max{1,kA+kB−N}
j
(
kA
j
)(
N − kA
kB − j
)
=
(
N
kA
)
kA
(
N − 1
kB − 1
)
=
kAkB
N
(
N
kA
)(
N
kB
)
. (4.18)
We can then get the S value to be
Sλ = 4
(
1− 2
N2
N∑
kA,kB=0
qkA(x|λ)
(
N
kA
)
qkB(y|λ)
(
N
kB
)
kAkB
)
, (4.19)
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with the constraints of qA(x|λ) and qB(y|λ),
N∑
kA=1
qkA(x|λ)
(
N
kA
)
= 1,
N∑
kB=1
qkB(y|λ)
(
N
kB
)
= 1. (4.20)
It is worth mentioning that the assumption that qA(x|λ) (qB(y|λ)) takes the same
value for equal kA (kB) is not obviously equivalent to the original optimization problem
defined in Eq. (4.17). We thus take this step as an additional assumption, and conjecture
it to be true for certain cases of the input randomness.
The problem defined in Eq. (4.19) with constraints of Eq. (4.20) cannot be solved
by linear programming directly, as to the nonlinear terms qkA(x|λ)qkB(y|λ). However,
we can still optimize it with similar methods used in the previous section. Define the
maximum randomness on each side
PA = [max
λ,x
qkA(x|λ)]1/N ,
PB = [max
λ,y
qkB(y|λ)]1/N . (4.21)
To maximize Sλ, we can do it first for the Alice side, qkA , and then Bob side qkB . By
doing so, it is not hard to see that Sλ is maximized by assigning qkA that has small
number of kA to be PA and that has large number of kA to be 0, and similarly for qkB .
Thus we need to first find lA and lB for Alice and Bob, such that,[
lA+1∑
kA=0
(
N
kA
)]−1/N
< PA ≤
[
lA∑
kA=0
(
N
kA
)]−1/N
[
lB+1∑
kB=0
(
N
kB
)]−1/N
< PB ≤
[
lB∑
kB=0
(
N
kB
)]−1/N
. (4.22)
Then we can assign qkA(x|λ) and qkB(y|λ) to be
qkA(x|λ) =

(PA)
N kA ≤ lA[
1−∑lAkA=0 PNA ( NkA)]−1/N
( NlA+1)
kA = lA + 1
0 kA > lA + 1
qkB(y|λ) =

(PB)
N kB ≤ lB[
1−∑lBkB=0 PNB ( NkB)]−1/N
( NlB+1)
kB = lB + 1
0 kB > lB + 1
(4.23)
to optimize Sλ defined in Eq. (4.19).
For finite N , we can also numerically solve the optimization problem defined in
Eq. (4.19). As shown in Fig. 3. The value S increases with the number of runs N , thus
the strategy with infinite rounds puts a bound on the strategy with finite rounds.
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Figure 3: Possible optimal value of the CHSH test for given randomness
P with various rounds N based on uncorrelated input. The solid line
corresponds the strategy for N →∞, which upper bounds all finite N cases.
The curves are not smooth for finite N as for similar reasons like in the one
party biased case, and it tends to be smooth with N →∞.
In the case of N →∞, we can also find analytical relation between optimized S and
the corresponded P . Similarly, we can first estimate PA and PB defined in Eq. (4.22)
with the limit of N →∞ by
lim
N→∞
PA = l¯
l¯A
A (1− l¯A)1−l¯A ,
lim
N→∞
PB = l¯
l¯B
B (1− l¯B)1−l¯B , (4.24)
where l¯A = lA/N and l¯B = lB/N , and S according to
S = 4− 8l¯Al¯B. (4.25)
As we still have to optimize over all possible PA and PB that satisfies PAPB = P ,
we cannot get a direct analytic formula like in Eq. (4.16), while we can still numerically
solve and plot it in Fig. 3. To reach a maximum quantum violation SQ = 2
√
2 with a
LHVM, the randomness is required to be P ≥ PQ ≈ 0.264.
5. Discussion
We take an additional assumption in the derivation of the both parties biased case, thus
the obtained bound PQ ≈ 0.264 is still an upper bound of a general optimal attack. As
we already know, the randomness requirement for the worst case, that is, multiple run
with Alice and Bob correlated, is strictly bounded by PQ ≈ 0.258 [19]. Thus, we know
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that the tight PQ for the case of multiple run but Alice and Bob uncorrelated should lie
in the regime of [0.258, 0.264].
To gain intuition why we take the additional assumption, first notice that what
we want is to minimize the average contribution of x · y in Eq. (4.17). In our case,
where P is near 1/4, qA(x|λ) and qB(y|λ) can be regarded as an approximately flat
distribution. On average, the x (y) contains less number of 1s will contribute more
to S, which means we should assign the corresponded probability qA(x|λ) (qA(y|λ))
bigger in order to maximize S. As qA(x|λ) (qA(y|λ)) is upper bounded by PA (PB),
an intuitive optimal strategy is then to let qA(x|λ) (qA(y|λ)) be PA (PB) for x (y)
contains less number of 1s, and be 0 for the ones contains more number of 1s. As
qA(x|λ) (qA(y|λ)) should also satisfy the normalization condition (Eq. (4.20)), we can
simply follow the strategy defined in Eq. (4.23) to realize the intuition, which on the
other hand satisfies the assumption we take. Follow the above intuition, we conjecture
the assumption to be true for certain cases of N . That is, for finite N , we conjecture it
to be true when equalities are taken in Eq. (4.22) for both PA and PB.
On the other hand, we want to emphasize that for a finite N , the assumption will
not generally hold in the optimal strategy if the equalities in Eq. (4.22) are not fulfilled.
For example, if the probability of lA + 1 and lB + 1 in Eq. (4.23) is not 0 but very small,
we should not take all qA(x|λ) and qB(y|λ) equally as qkA and qkB , especially for the case
of L1(x) = lA + 1 and L1(y) = lB + 1 , respectively. In fact, there do exists a cleverer
assignment of qA(x|λ) and qB(y|λ) such that only x and y that gives small x · y get
probability instead of all of x and y that L1(x) = lA + 1 and L1(B) = lB + 1. However,
with increasing runs N , this kind of clever attack stops working as for the equalities
can be more approximately satisfied with larger N . Therefore, we also conjecture the
assumption to be true for all possible P with N goes to infinity.
As we can see, our obtained PQ ≈ 0.264 is already very close to the worst case value
that is 0.258, we can therefore conclude that the multiple run correlation is already a
strong resource for the adversary, no matter whether Alice and Bob are correlated or
not. In addition, as we know that the bound PQ for the most loose case, that is, single
run and Alice Bob uncorrelated, is given to be 0.354 [14], we also suggest that the key
loophole of the input randomness is the correlation between multiple runs instead of
correlation of Alice and Bob.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we consider the randomness requirement of CHSH test in the multiple
run scenario. By considering an adversary Eve who independently controls the input
randomness of Alice and Bob, we investigate the minimum randomness requirement to
guarantee that a violation of the CHSH inequality is not due to Eve’s attack (LHVM).
Considering that Eve controls only Alice’s input but leaves Bob’s input uniformly
distributed, we found the randomness Eve need to control to fake a quantum violation
is PQ = 0.273. And the randomness required when controlling both Alice and Bob is
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PQ ≤ 0.264. By comparing the results to the ones listed in Table. 1, we conclude that
the key randomness loophole is due to the correlation between multiple runs. As the
randomness requirement which considers multiple run attack is not easy to realize in real
experiments, we thus suggest the experiments to rule correlations of the input settings
from different runs. To guarantee the securities of the device independent tasks, we also
suggest that one should check whether there is correlation between random inputs from
different runs.
For further research, we are interested to know whether there exists Bell inequalities
that suffers less from the randomness loophole. By assuming different kinds of
assumptions, the randomness requirement behaves different. Recently, by considering
a nonzero lower bound for the input random probability p(x, y|λ), Pu¨tz et al. show a
Bell inequality which suffers from very little randomness loophole [23]. That is, any
adversary cannot fake a quantum violation as long as the lower bound of p(x, y|λ) is
nonzero regardless of its upper bound P defined in Eq. (2.1). Therefore, it is interesting
to investigate the multiple run randomness requirement of the CHSH inequality with
additional assumption.
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